Dajal (bahasa Arab: الدّجّال ad-Dajjāl) adalah seorang tokoh dalam eskatologi Islam yang akan muncul menjelang kiamat. Dajal dikatakan kafir dan jahat, pembawa fitnah (ujian) terbesar dan tidak ada ujian yang terbesar selain itu.
Kemudian para nabi sebelum Nabi Muhammad telah pula menjelaskan tentang Dajal kepada umatnya, hanya tidak sedetail penjelasan Muhammad, seperti Dajal adalah seorang yang pecak (buta) disalah satu matanya.
Before exploring the interaction of social democratic thought with electoral law we might reflect on its boundaries. Social democracy is not the same as democratic socialism; flipping the adjective and noun matters. Ewing’s second major work on political finance opens with this breath-catching epigraph:
Wealth is almost invariably selfish and lacking in moral principle. Its interests are often diametrically opposed to sound public policy.
Social democracy on the other hand is a less demanding philosophy than democratic socialism. (Compare John Rawls vacillating between ‘market socialism’ and ‘property-owning democracy’ in his final ‘restatement’ of his theory of justice). Whilst lacking democratic socialism’s concern for equality of outcomes, it goes beyond the welfare liberal’s concern with enhancing equal opportunity of individuals. Social democrats thus share with democratic socialists a distaste for liberalism’s reduction of the world to individuals. They recognise that humans are embedded in groups and that social whole is not blindly evolving through competitive forces but is a vehicle for enhancing the common good. Admittedly, the forms of human flourishing are diverse, so that there is not a single conception of ‘the good life’. Yet, regardless of whether ‘democracy’ is used adjectively or as a noun, the two philosophies share a creed: electoral democracy must seek to underpin forms of representative practice that recognise the connectedness and equal worth of everyone.
A. Purpose as Norms: Concretising the Search for Guiding Principles
To flesh out the quest for electoral law theory, we need to concretise the topic. To do this, let us briefly consider three basic and perennial questions in electoral democracy. These are: the franchise, in the sense (a) who votes, and (b) what a vote is worth; plus (c) the voting system. I have chosen these as they are first order issues of the sort that are often thought to have been definitively settled a century ago. But, as we shall see, they are in significant part still normatively open and contested.
i. Who Votes
It’s now an axiomatic principle of liberal democracy that that the suffrage should be universal. Of course it has not always been that way: chartists and other social democrats had to win that battle in the nineteenth century against conservative forces. The latter feared ‘ir’responsible government if the economically dependent (workers, women) had the same franchise as propertied men. But the battle was eventually won, with most women finally gaining a vote in the UK a century ago.
Yet as to what ‘universal’ means in practice, there remain disagreements. Should citizens resident abroad vote, or should non-citizen permanent residents vote? Here there is fundamental disagreement. To social democrats, there is a preferred answer. ‘No’ to expatriate voting, but yes to permanent residents. This flows from the progressive idea of substantive interests, over liberal valorising of citizenship per se or a conservative idea of birthrights.
So far, so good. There is in-principle agreement on the universality of the franchise, and a social democratic position on citizenship versus residency. But what of the obvious next question: is voting to be voluntary, or compulsory? Here, one might think social democrats would embrace compulsion. Compulsory turnout is a shibboleth of the centre-left in Australia, and compulsory enrolment likewise in New Zealand. Compulsion seeks to maximise voice and it may nudge policy towards more substantively egalitarian outcomes, say its proponents. Yet such rules have not spread to other common law democracies. In the UK, compulsory turnout attracted some support from within the Labour Government in the mid-2000s, leading to a Ministry of Justice green paper canvassing a statutory ‘duty’ to vote but without any sanctions to enforce it. But the proposal went nowhere. Of course inertia favours the status quo, but compulsory voting is a classic example of a fundamental issue where liberty and equality norms collide intractably.
ii. The ‘Weight’ of Each Vote
One-vote, one-value may seem to be a no-brainer today, as a correlative of a universal franchise. And yet … witness its long absence from the distribution of seats in Westminster, and the limited interest of social democrats in implementing it. It would be too easy to suggest that allowing smaller enrolments for ‘regional’ seats in the UK is a partisan redoubt (Labour being historically stronger in Wales and Scotland than the epicentre of southern England). There are principles at play as well. In contrast, for American progressives the fight has all been the other way. In ‘easily the most important case in the [US] law of politics canon’, they won a strict one-vote, one-value rule by convincing the Supreme Court to imply it from the Bill of Rights and the ‘equal protection of the laws’.
There are counter-arguments, from a different view of representation, that votes need not be weighted equally if power and wealth is disproportionately centred in one region. Take London and the ‘home’ counties of England, within the UK. Devolution may help redress the power imbalance amongst the nations of the UK, but the south of England remains wealthier than regions adjusting to the post-industrial economy, key constituencies for Labour’s socio-economic project. One-vote, one-value is more than a mere a ‘slogan or political catchcry’ (as it was once dismissed by an Australian Chief Justice);31 however it is not a universal principle. At different times and places conservatives and social democrats have recognised that equity of treatment and voice is not always the same as mathematical equality of votes. Does this suggest agreement over an underlying principle of substantive equality? Not necessarily. But what it does reveal is that even within an ideal like ‘political equality’, different notions of ‘equality’ exhibit strong tension.
iii. The Voting System
Here, there are a smorgasbord of models, each with profound differences for the degree of electoral choice and for the make-up of parliaments and government. To name just the three most prominent clusters of options in use, there are forms of proportional representation (PR), majoritarian run-offs (including the preferential or alternative vote (AV)), and the old stand-by of first-past-the-post or plurality voting. Even in countries with similar Westminster lower houses, common law and party systems, the room for principled difference is profound.
Given the chance in a referendum in 2010, the British Labour Party declined to embrace AV. Part of its reason was a preference for strong, responsible party government, an artefact of a view of popular sovereignty that is wary of bicameralism let alone coalition government. Labour prefers to take its chances on the bipolar pendulum rather than risk further fracturing of the left-of-centre vote. Preferential voting, after all, was a system introduced in Australia to diminish the effect of any split in the conservative vote between parties of the right. But it is an article of faith on the left in Australia. Australia’s most progressive Prime Minister since WW2 even went as far as to praise optional preferential voting, as the one system that allows electors to express indifference to options on the ballot. Further abroad, in much of continental Europe, PR is seen as a necessary social democratic position, expressing the diversity principle of representation and reflecting a sense of the value of multi- party jostling and co-operation.
Sumber: Buku The Law of Electoral Democracy: Theory and Purpose
One of the most vexed questions concerning think tanks is whether or not they have policy influence. Notwithstanding extensive growth, think tanks do not enjoy automatic political access. Attempting to broker policy analysis to decision makers does not equate with immediate policy impact on forthcoming legislation or executive thinking. Relatively few think tanks make key contributions to decision making in local, national, or regional global fora, or exert paradigmatic influence over policy thinking. Instead, it is more appropriate to view them as cogs in the wider machineries of governance. Furthermore, think tank research and reports do not escape challenges or criticism from other knowledge actors in universities, whilst they may be ignored or patronized at will by governments, corporations, and international organizations. However, this is not to suggest that these organizations are without intellectual authority or policy influence.
First, think tanks appropriate authority on the basis of their scholarly credentials as quasiacademic organizations focused on the rigorous and professional analysis of policy issues. Many use their presumed “independent” status as civil society organizations to strengthen their reputation as beholden neither to the interests of market nor the state. These endowments give think tanks some legitimacy in seeking to intervene with knowledge and advice in policy processes. However, a recent empirical survey of European decision makers, journalists, and academics’ views about the impact of think tanks discovered critical and cautious perceptions of influence:
All (interviewees) insisted on the importance of a healthy think tank sector for E.U. policy making while criticising their relative lack of strength and ability to provide added-value, sometimes their lack of impact and relevance; and fi nally an approach seen as too technocratic and elitist. (Boucher et al. 2004, 85)
Nevertheless, these organizations acquire political credibility by performing services for states and for non-state actors. In short, the sources of demand help explain think tank relevance and utility if not direct policy infl uence. Think tanks respond to demand for high-quality and reputable research and analysis, ideas, and argumentation. In addition, they provide services such as ethics or policy training for civil servants, or by organizing conferences or seminars. Similarly, they have become useful translators of the abstract modeling and dense theoretical concepts characteristic of contemporary social science. For governments concerned about evidence-based policy, think tanks potentially help create a more rational policy process by augmenting in-house research capacities, circumventing time and institutional constraints, and alerting elites to changing policy conditions (Dror 1984). Thus, it may be less the case that think tanks have an impact on government and more the case that governments or certain political leaders employ these organizations as tools to pursue their own interests and provide intellectual legitimation for policy.
Think tanks also contribute to governance and institution building by facilitating exchange between official and other private actors as interlocutors and network entrepreneurs. Networks are important to think tanks both in embedding them in a relationship with more powerful actors, and in increasing their constituency, there by potentially amplifying their impact. However, such relationships also pull think tanks toward advocacy and ideological polemic or partisanship and politicization. Too close an affinity with government, a political party, or NGOs can seriously undermine their authority and legitimacy as objective (or at least balanced) knowledge providers, and potentially dissolve important distinctions between the research institute and advocacy group.
Rather than organizations for rational knowledge utilization in policy, think tank development is also indicative of the wider politicization of policy analysis. In a few countries, think tanks are a means of career advancement or a stepping stone for the politically ambitious. This has lead to the hollowing out of British think tanks after election of a new government (Denham and Garnett 2004). The revolving-door of individuals moving between executive appointment and think tanks, law firms, or universities is a well-known phenomenon in the United States and is increasingly seen in Central and Eastern Europe and sub- Saharan African countries. In short, rather than the policy analysis papers—or published output—having infl uence, it is the policy analytic capacity—or human capital—that has long term infl uence and resonance inside government, and increasingly international organizations.
Some think tanks attract more media than government attention. The capacity to gain funds from foundations, governments, and corporations to undertake their policy analysis is indirect recognition of the value of many institutes. Others value the pluralism of debate that think tanks can bring to liberal democracies, and this is one rationale behind the think tank capacity building initiatives of development agencies. In neopluralist thinking, independent think tanks are often portrayed as creating a more open, participatory and educated populace and represent a counter to the infl uence of powerful techno-bureaucratic, corporate, and media interests on the policy agenda. Moreover, a more informed, knowledge-based policy process—a role that think tank experts help fulfill—could enlighten decision making (Weiss 1990).
Early American studies of think tanks often adopted power approaches to the role of think tanks in decision making. Elite studies of institutes such as the Brookings Institution (Dye 1978) emphasized how think tanks are key components of the power elite where decision making is concentrated in the hands of a few groups and individuals. Similarly, some Marxists argued that establishment think tanks are consensus-building organizations developing and debating the ideology and long-range plans that convert problems of political economy into manageable objects of public policy. As the common economic interests and social cohesion among the power elite or ruling class is insuffi cient to produce consensus on policies, agreement on such matters requires “research, consultation and deliberation” to form a coherent sense of long-term class interests (Domhoff 1983, 82) and maintain hegemonic control (Desai 1994). However, these studies direct analysis toward well-known policy institutions with solid links to political parties or the corporate sector, neglecting the role of smaller, lesser-known institutes which thrive in much larger numbers than the elite think tanks.
In general, contemporary analysts are skeptical of think tanks exerting consistent direct impact on politics (see essays in Stone and Denham 2004). Instead, they develop wider and more nuanced understandings of think tank policy influence and social relevance in their roles as agenda-setters who create policy narratives that capture the political and public imagination. This ability to set the terms of debate, define problems and shape policy perception has been described elsewhere as “atmospheric” influence (James 2000, 163). Moreover, the fluctuating and changing influence of think tanks has much to do with the way in which think tanks interact over time in epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, and discourse coalitions. The epistemic community concept (Haas 1992) focuses on the specific role of experts in the policy process and the heightened influence of consensual knowledge in conditions of policy uncertainty (Ullrich 2004). In this perspective, think tanks wield their expertise and analysis as objectified scientific input to policy. The advocacy coalition approach emphasizes an alternative view that analysis has a long-term enlightenment function in altering policy orthodoxies, and highlights the role of beliefs, values and ideas as a neglected dimension of policy making (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2004). By contrast, discourse approaches emphasize the role of language and political symbolism in the definition and perception of policy problem. It is a constructivist approach that emphasizes intersubjective knowledge—common understandings and shared identities—as the dynamic for change and in which think tanks are wordsmiths. In these perspectives, it is in the longue duree that think tank policy analysis and activity has achieved wider social relevance and shaping patterns of governance and moving paradigms.
Sumber: Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods
VISTA – Tony Gunawan tak pernah membayangkan bakal bertanding lagi di Olimpiade. Tapi kini, atlet yang sebelumnya berwarga negara Indonesia itu, akan mewakili Amerika Serikat di Olimpiade 2012 yang digelar di London, Inggris.
“Ghosts are still unexplained phenomena. What do you believe?”
Hingga kini para ilmuwan masih tidak percaya atas keberadaan hantu. Walaupun misalkan hantu itu ada, tapi tetap susah untuk dapat dibuktikan secara nyata. Karena menurut orang-orang yang percaya, hantu berada di alam lain, tidak kasat mata, namun kadang bisa dirasakan bahkan bisa terlihat pada saat-saat tertentu.
Cerita hantu dan mistis terjadi di pelbagai belahan dunia. Banyak tempat angker dipercaya para hantu menghuni di situ. Wilayah mistis ini menyimpan sejuta misteri dan latar belakang peristiwa mengerikan. Sebagian penduduk dunia penasaran namun juga memilih untuk tidak menapaki tempat ini.
Dilansir dari situs enviromentalgrafitti.com, setidaknya ada 10 tempat paling angker sejagat. Di mana saja? Berikut ulasannya.
Komando Pasukan Khusus yang disingkat menjadi Kopassus adalah bagian dari Komando Utama (KOTAMA) tempur yang dimiliki olehTNI Angkatan Darat, Indonesia. Kopassus memiliki kemampuan khusus seperti bergerak cepat di setiap medan, menembak dengan tepat, pengintaian, dan anti teror.
Jihad ( جهاد ) adalah berjuang dengan sungguh-sungguh menurut syariat Islam. Jihad dilaksanakan untuk menjalankan misi utama manusia yaitu menegakkan Din Allah atau menjaga Din tetap tegak, dengan cara-cara sesuai dengan garis perjuangan para Rasul dan Al-Quran. Jihad yang dilaksanakan Rasul adalah berdakwah agar manusia meninggalkan kemusyrikan dan kembali kepada aturan Allah, menyucikan qalbu, memberikan pengajaran kepada ummatdan mendidik manusia agar sesuai dengan tujuan penciptaan mereka yaitu menjadi khalifah Allah di bumi.
hallo nama saya aditya fathurridho, saya masih baru dalam dunia blog. kali ini saya akan memposting tentang sepakbola, saya sering bermain atau menonton sepakbola. tetapi saat menonton sepakbola saya sering melihat gol-gol indah yang tercipta salah satunya gol dari tendangan bebas (freekick).
sangkarilmu.wordpress.com 